Tuesday 23 June 2015

Commitment to Theory

Here an attempt has been made to explore and define the notions about cultural identity following the turn of events in the 19th century Europe.

The main points factored here are:
  • To rethink on the "perspective of identity of our culture" in the post colonial world.
  • Begin by differentiating 'cultural diversity' and 'cultural identity'
  • Culture- as a strategy for survival in transnational and transrational. 

Bhabha’s goal in this essay is to “rethink our perspective on the identity of culture” in the Post-colonial world. He begins by drawing a distinction between (what some such as Kamau Brathwaite [in Contradictory Omens] have termed) “cultural diversity” and what he terms “cultural difference” in an allusion to the term ‘différence/différance’ so central to Post-Structuralist thinking. The following chart shows what Bhabha perceives to be the play of difference (rather than pure distinction) between these two terms:


Cultural Diversity
Cultural Difference
An object of empirical knowledge
The process of enunciation of culture as knowledgeable, authoritative, adequate to the construction of the systems of cultural identification.
A category of comparative ethics, aesthetics, or ethnology
A process of signification through which statements “of” or “on” culture differentiate.
The recognition of pre-given cultural ‘contents' and customs, held in a time frame of relativism, it gives rise to anodyne liberal notions of multiculturalism, cultural exchange, or the culture of humanity.
The problem of the culture emerges only at the significatory boundaries of culture, where meanings and values are (mis)read or signs misappropriated.
Cultural diversity is also the representation of a radical rhetoric of the separation of totalized cultures that live unsullied by the intertextuality of their historical locations, safe in the Utopianism of a mythic memory of a unique collective identity


Bhabha’s point in pointing out the difference between these two terms is to stress the need to rethink the traditional notions of cultural identity which have informed the process of decolonisation (what Bhabha alludes to as an antagonistic view of “culture-as-political-struggle”) and the concomitant growth of nationalism.

Bhabha's basic theory is to suggest a need to "rethink cultural identity."   For Bhabha, the Postcolonial setting is one in which there is still an oppositional relationship between previously "dominant cultures" and "the other."  The imperialism might be understated and surreptitious, but it is still there.  Bhabha's theory is to demand a reconfiguration of this relationship.  There needs to be a zone in which the cultural relationship between former colonizers and nations that were formerly colonized transcends the historical antagonism between them.  "The Other" should not be perceived as a force to be submissive.  It should not be one in which "First World capital" translates into "Third world labor."

The fundamental call that Bhabha makes is that the identity formation should be as wide as possible for Postcolonial nations.  Enunciation of this identity should outstrip what former imperialistic nations still perceive "the other" to be.  Cultural diversity is called here in to exist in its purest and freest form and it is here where the "commitment to theory" must be upheld in the modern setting.

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Bhabha's basic theory is to suggest a need to "rethink cultural identity."   For Bhabha, the Postcolonial setting is one in which there is still an oppositional relationship between previously "dominant cultures" and "the other."  The imperialism might be understated and surreptitious, but it is still there.  Bhabha's theory is to demand a reconfiguration of this relationship.  There needs to be a zone in which the cultural relationship between former colonizers and nations that were formerly colonized transcends the historical antagonism between them.  "The Other" should not be perceived as a force to be submissive.  It should not be one in which "First World capital" translates into "Third world labor."

The fundamental call that Bhabha makes is that the identity formation should be as wide as possible for Postcolonial nations.  Enunciation of this identity should outstrip what former imperialistic nations still perceive "the other" to be.  Cultural diversity is called here in to exist in its purest and freest form and it is here where the "commitment to theory" must be upheld in the modern setting.

One theme in Bhabha's writing is how the relationship between nations needs to be reconfigured to ensure that there is a "commitment to theory."  In this case, the theory that is being examined is whether that we have escaped the colonial or imperialist condition in which nations relate to one another.  This theme takes on different forms, but drives the article.  Bhabha's notion of exploring the relationship in which the theory of internationalism is merely used to prop up "First World capital to Third World labor" is a part of this exploration.

For Bhabha, the commitment to theory has become a new way to pursue the ends of colonial control.  "The Other" has become relegated to a condition in which control is being advocated through new and surreptitious means.  Bhabha's example of the film festival in which the entry from India depicts the most hopeless and destitute helps to enhance the condition in which "First world" nations feel little in way of reticence to ensure that messages are communicated that suggest that national identities should be formed in accordance with "Western" ideals.  The relationship between both "the other" and those who benefit from this configuration is a significant theme in his work.

In "The Commitment to Theory," an essay collected in The Location of Culture (1994), Homi K. Bhabha foregrounds the unfortunate and perhaps false opposition of theory and politics that some critics have framed in order to question the elitism and Eurocentrism of prevailing postcolonial debates:

There is a damaging and self-defeating assumption that theory is necessarily the elite language of the socially and culturally privileged. It is said that the place of the academic critic is inevitably within the Eurocentric archives of an imperialist or neo-colonial West.

What's ironic is that Bhabha himself--perhaps more than any other leading postcolonial theorist--has throughout his career been susceptible to charges of elitism, Eurocentrism, bourgeois academic privilege, and an indebtedness to the principles of European poststructuralism that many of his harshest critics portray as his unknowing replication of "neo-imperial" or "neo-colonial" modes of discursive dominance over the colonized Third World. By means of a complicated repertoire of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Postmodern notions of mimicry and performance, and Derridian deconstruction, Bhabha has encouraged a rigorous rethinking of nationalism, representation, and resistance that above all stresses the "ambivalence" or "hybridity" that characterizes the site of colonial contestation--a "liminal" space in which cultural differences articulate and, as Bhabha argues, actually produce imagined "constructions" of cultural and national identity.

Whereas Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak uses deconstruction as a critical tool to rethink the oversimplified binary opposition of "colonizer" and "colonized" and to question the methodological assumptions of postcolonial theorists (herself included), Homi K. Bhabha uses deconstruction to dismantle the false opposition of "theory" and "political practice"--a distinction reminiscent in many ways of Marx's distinction between superstructure and base. Bhabha advocates a model of liminality that perhaps dramatizes the interstitial space between theory and practice--a liminal space that does not separate but rather mediates their mutual exchange and relative meanings. Bhabha argues (perhaps in defense of himself) that European theoretical frameworks are not necessarily intellectual constructs that ignore the political situation of the dispossessed Third World. A critic cannot choose between "politics" and "theory" because the two are mutually reciprocal; "theory," an instrument of ideology, narrates and in so doing creates the "political" circumstance of Third World oppression. In other words, much as he treats the the "liminal" space between national constituencies, Bhabha is interested in juxtaposing "politics" and "theory" in order to find where they overlap and how the tension between them in turn produces their hybridity:

The pact of interpretation is never simply an act of communication between the I and the You designated in the statement. The production of meaning requires that these two places be mobilized in the passage through a Third Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the specific implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot 'in itself' be conscious. (The Location of Culture36)

According to Bhabha, the "third space"--another way of framing the liminal--is an ambivalent, hybrid space that is written into existence. In other words, what mediates between theory and politics is writing--not merely theoretical discourse but cultural exercises such as novels, cinema, music. As Jacques Derrida suggests in Writing and Differance, writing does not passively record social "realities" but in fact precedes them and gives them meaning through a recognition of the differences between signs within textual systems. Bhabha, then, re-appropriates Derrida's notion of differance to suggest cultural difference and its representation and negotiation in the form of writing. Having already posed the question of "what is to be done" about the precarious pedagogical legitimacy of postcolonial debates, in the following passage Bhabha conceptualizes writing as a productive way of conceptualizing the differences between cultures:

Within this essay Bhabha accomplishes many things, yet he seems to focus upon two main subjects and issues: the troubling of political and ideological discourse and then the differentiation between culture difference and culture diversity.  Bhabha illustrates the relationship between politics and ideology, bringing out important points of encounter. There is a sort of space, where discourse and ideology, language and the representation of such lie--this space--is where Bhabha means to place focus, and put attention.

Bhabha means to speak to the relationship between politics and theory, and the manner in which they depend on each other. Calling back to Derrida's differance, Bhabha sums up this relationship as "the difference of the same." This is where Bhabha begins to elaborate on the relationship itself. He beings by looking at the nature of theory: language, ideology, semiotics, representation, and so on. Theory, "in a doubly inscribed move, simultaneously seeks to subvert and replace." Theory's attempt to supplant, replace, re-present and so on exists in relation to the very thing that it striving to remove. This relationship, though obvious, puts forth a proposition that Bhabha requests: he wants us to "rethink the logics of causality and dterminacy through which we recognize the 'political' as a form of calculation and strategic action dedicated to social transformation." Further, the 'political' that theory calls attention to is delegated through an identification of the logics of causality: it seems that Bhabha is asking us to rethink how we approach and understand political discourse and the political subject as determined by systems of identification that are bent on alterity, otherness, heterogeniety. By rethinking these categories as determined and intimately connected with history we may begin to see the relationship between political and ideological discourse as developing side by side, as opposed to preceeding and following.

The rethinking of the logics of causality, politics and then the strategic action of either the political or ideological discourse leads to the obvious troubling of the representation of either of these categories:
With this troubling of these categories, through the assertion of rethinking the logics of causality (understanding the importance of writing and textuality), which leads us to understanding that the 'political' as a calculated form of societal transformation and affection (meaning maintaining purpose to cause effect in society) Bhabha leads us to a good explanation of the troubling of these categories:

Stemming from this call to rethinking and re-evaluating our categories concerning political and ideological discourse, Bhabha leads us to the fact that these categories as now understood depend on alterity, on a agonisitic environment of "cultural difference" and "cultural diversity." Simply, it seems to me that an initial difficulty with understanding these issues arises from the idea of one emerging before another, and thus one being pre-established. Here Bhabha means to focus on the fact that much of the acceptance of these categories has depended upon a sort of understanding that one category may negate or supercede the other. Instead, Bhabha calls for a sort of third space: a negotiation that he called to earlier in referring to a sort of "to and fro." Bhabha seems to critique a singleness of terms. Instead, he asks for a heterogeneity of categories.

This third space, which is neither one category or the other, results as a rethinking of the logics of causality and recognition of political discourses relationship to social transformation.
Throughout the rest of his essay, Bhabha elaborates on the terms of cultural difference and cutlrual diversity. He upholds an argument for thinking of things in multiplicity, in heterogeneity, of thinking of cultures, peoples, histories, politics and ideology as developing together, of simultaneously sustaining one another, and all of this operating within a certain amount of ambivalence.

What seems to be at stake here, is the issue of cultural identification in a post-colonial world. Much of what Bhabha speaks to deals with representation, of historical emergence, enunciation of identity that is in turn simultaneously created only out of a sort of alterity. Yet this creation, this enunciation is qualified by the process of writing, or textuality that prohibits it from any sort of ability to stand alone. The relation here is the signifier to the signified and the fact that Bhabha questions to the notion of given concepts, as opposed to simultaneously created subject, objects only in the process of alterity. Here, Bhabha offers a final clarification of cultural diversity and cultural difference.

In a round about sort of way, Bhabha's emphasis on the differentiation between cultural difference and cultural diversity entails his concepts of hybridity, along with this assertion of rethinking the logics of causality, and furthermore, this rethinking puts forth the fact that maintaining any single notion of cultural identity and so on is extremely troublesome when one looks at the truth of political and ideological discourse.

Monday 22 June 2015

The Grief of Yasodhara - Brihadaranyaka Upanishad


Yasodhara was the daughter of King Suppabuddha and Pamitā, sister of the Buddha's father, King Suddhodana.She was born on same day in the month of "Vaishaka" as Prince Siddaratha. Her father was a Koliya chief and her mother came from a Shakya family. The Shakya and the Koliya were branches of the Ādicca or Ikśvāku clan of the solar dynasty. There were no other families considered equal to them in the region and therefore members of these two royal families married only among themselves.

She was wedded to her cousin, the Shakya prince Siddhartha, in his 16th year when she was also 16 years of age. At the age of 29, she gave birth to their only child, a boy named Rāhula. On the day of his birth, the Prince left the palace. Yasodharā was devastated and overcome with grief. Hearing that her husband was leading a holy life, she emulated him by removing her jewellery, wearing a plain yellow robe and eating only one meal a day. Although relatives sent her messages to say that they would maintain her, she did not take up those offers. Several princes sought her hand but she rejected the proposals. Throughout his six-year absence, Princess Yasodharā followed the news of his actions closely.

When the Buddha visited Kapilavatthu after enlightenment, Yasodharā did not go to see her former husband but ask Rahula to go to Buddha to seek inheritance. For herself, she thought: "Surely if I have gained any virtue at all the Lord will come to my presence." In order to fulfill her wish Buddha came into her presence and admired her patience and sacrifice helped him to fulfill his wishes not in this birth but also in previous birth.

Some time after her son Rāhula became a novice monk, Yasodharā also entered the Order of Monks and Nuns and within time attained Arahantship. She was ordained as Bhikkhuni included among the five hundred ladies following Mahapajapati Gotami to establish Bhikkhuni Order. She died at 78, two years before Buddha's Parinibbāna.

Princess Yasodhara was the daughter of King Suppabuddha and Queen Pamita. Pamita was the sister of Buddha's father, King Suddhodana. Thus Yasodhara was the Buddha's cousin and later she was married to him.

Yasodhara was of same age as Prince Siddhartha. They were married when they were both sixteen years old. At the age of twenty-nine Yasodhara gave birth to their only son, Rahula. When Rahula was born, on the same day Prince Siddhartha left the palace in search of enlightenment. When Yasodhara knew that Siddhartha has left the palace, the palace, which was once the place of luxury, comfort and happiness to her, suddenly became like a dark cell to her. She was devastated and was full of grief. Her only comfort was her newborn son.

When Yasodhara came to know that her husband was leading a holy life, she simulated him by removing her jewelry and abandoning the royal dress and meal she wore only a plain yellow robe and took meal once in a day.

Her relatives sent her messages that they would maintain her, but she did not take those offers. Several princes wanted to marry him but she declined all the proposals. Princess Siddhartha struggled for six years to attain enlightenment. Princess Yasodhara closely followed the news about his actions and performed likewise.

When Buddha came to Kapilavastu, Yasodhara did not go to visit him. She thought if she had gained any virtue Lord Buddha would definitely come to visit her. One day after the meal Buddha came to Yasodhara's chamber with his two disciples and sat on the seat prepared for him. When Yasodhara heard about this, she hurriedly came to the chamber and placed her head on the feet of Buddha and clasped his ankles. Thus she showed her reverence, affection and respect to him.

When Yasodhara's son Rahula became a novice monk, Yasodhara also entered the order of nuns. She became Arahant very quickly. Amongst the female disciples of Buddha, she was chief among those who attained great supernormal powers. Yasodhara died two years ago of the Parinirvana of Lord Buddha at the age of seventy-eight. 

According to the legends in Buddha's life, Yasodhara met Siddhartha for the first time in her previous life. Then there was a Brahmin named as Sumedha, who identified current Buddha Dipankara as the future Buddha. He was waiting in the city of Paduma for Dipankara and tried to buy flowers for him. But Sumedha came to know that king had bought all the flowers to offer to Dipankara. Then Sumedha saw a girl named Sumidha approached to him with eight lotuses in her hand. Sumedha wanted to buy one
flower from her but Sumidha recognized his potential and gave him five flowers against the promise that in the next birth they would be the husband and wife.

Brihadaranyaka Upanishad - The Tree and Man





Ethics:  The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad includes hymns on virtues and ethics. In verse 5.2.3, for example, it recommends three virtues: self-restraint (Damah), charity (Daanam) and compassion for all life ( Daya).
Learn three cardinal virtues - temperance, charity and compassion for all life.

The first ethical precept of Brihadaranyaka Upanishad became the foundation of Yamas in various schools of Hinduism.

In Yoga school, for example, the yamas as listed by Patañjali in Yogasūtra 2.30 are
1.            Ahimsa: restraint from initiating violence, harm, injury to other living beings by actions, words or in one's thoughts
2.            Satya:  restraint from falsehood
3.            Asteya: restraint from stealing
4.            Brahmacarya: restraint from sex if without a partner, and from cheating on one's partner
5.            Aparigraha: restraint from avarice and possessiveness.

Psychology
The verses in the Upanishad contain theories pertaining to psychology and human motivations.Verse 1.4.17 describes the desire for progeny as the desire to be born again. The Upanishad states a behavioral theory, linking action to nature, suggesting that behavioral habits makes a man,

According as one acts, so does he become; one becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action.
Ancient and medieval Indian scholars have referred to Brihadaranyaka Upanishad as a foundation to discuss psychological theories, the nature of psyche, and how body, mind and soul interact. For example, Adi Shankara in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad explains the relation between consciousness, the mind and the body.

Mind creates desire, asserts Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, with its basis in pleasure. Eye is the cause of material wealth, because it is through sight that wealth is created states the Upanishad, while ears are spiritual wealth, because it is through listening that knowledge is shared.The Upanishad suggests in the dialogue between Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi, husband and wife, that one does not love an object for the sake of the object but for the sake of the subject, the Self (the soul of the other person).

Metaphysics
Verse 1.3.28 acknowledges that metaphysical statements in Upanishads are meant to guide the reader from unreality to reality. The metaphysics of Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is non-dualism (Advaita). For instance, in verse 2.4.13 Yajnavalkya asserts that everything in the universe is the Self. The nature of reality or Self is described as consciousness-bliss in verse 3.9.28. Neti-neti or (not this—not this) is a method of emphasizing the discovery of the right, by excluding the wrong. The verse 5.1 states that the Universe, Reality and Consciousness is infinite.

"From infinite or fullness, we can get only fullness or infinite". The above verse describes the nature of the Absolute or Brahman which is infinite or full, i.e., it contains everything. Upanishadic metaphysics is further elucidated in the Madhu-vidya (honey doctrine), where the essence of every object is described to be same to the essence of every other object. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad looks at reality as being indescribable and its nature to be infinite and consciousness-bliss. The cosmic energy is thought to integrate in the microcosm and in the macrocosm integrate the individual to the universe.

As is a mighty tree, so indeed is a man: this is true. His hairs are the leaves and his skin is the outer bark. 2. From his skin blood flows and from the bark, sap. Therefore when a man is Wounded blood flows, as sap from a tree that is injured. 3. His flesh is its inner bark and his nerves are its innermost layer of bark, which is tough. His bones lie within, as does the wood of the tree. His marrow resembles the pith. 4. A tree, when it is felled, springs again from its root in a new form; from what root, tell me, does a man spring forth after he is cut off by death? 5. Do not say: From the semen, for that is produced from the living man. A tree springs from the seed as well; after it is dead it certainly springs again. 6. If a tree is pulled up with its root, it will not spring again. From what root, tell me, does a mortal spring forth after he is cut off by death? 7. If you think he is indeed born, I say: No, he is born again. Now who should again bring him forth? The Upanishad states: It is Brahman, which is absolute Knowledge and Bliss, the ultimate goal of him who offers wealth and also of him who has realized Brahman and stands firm in It.

Man Compared to a Tree
 Yājñavalkya says: "If any one of you wants to put more questions, let him come forward." Nobody dared to open his mouth afterwards. They all wanted to know whether it could be possible for them to get away from that place, because the head is very dear. Atha hovāca, brāhmaā bhagavanto, yo va kāmayate sa mā pcchatu: "Learned men! If any one of you can stand up and ask me any more questions, I am ready to answer. Sarve vā mā pcchata, yo va kāmayate, ta va pchāmi, sarvān vā va pcchamīti: Or, all of you can put questions to me at one stroke; I am ready to answer. Or, I may question you, if you like, singly. Or, I may question all of you." When this was told by Yājñavalkya, everyone kept quiet. Te ha brāhmaā na dadhṛṣu: Everyone was frightened of this consequence of Śākalya's head falling off, and so they kept their mouths closed and did not put any further questions.

Then Yājñavalkya speaks independently, without being put any question. Yathā vko vanaspati, tathaiva puruo'mṛṣā: "Friends! The human being is something like a tree. There is some similarity between a tree and a human being. The hair on the body of a human being may be compared to the leaves on the tree. Just as leaves grow on the tree, hair grows on the body." Tasya lomāni parāni, tvag asyotpāikā bahi: "The bark of a tree and the skin of the human being may be compared likewise. Just as there is bark outside the tree, there is skin on the outside of the body." Tvaca evāsya rudhiram prasyandi: "From the bark, the juice of the tree exudes. Likewise, blood can exude from the skin of a body." Tvaca utpaa; tasmāt, tad ātṛṇṇāt praiti, raso vkād ivāhatat: "When you cut a tree, its essence exudes. Likewise, an injured person exudes blood from the body." Māsāny asya śakarāi, kināa: "The inner bark of the tree may be compared to the flesh in the body of a human being." Kināa snāva, tat sthiram: "The sinews inside the flesh of the human body may be compared to the innermost bark of the tree." Asthīny antarato dārūi: "The bones inside the body may be compared to the pith of the wood inside the tree." Majjopamā ktā: "The marrow inside the bones may be compared to the marrow inside the pith of the tree."

Yad vko vko rohati mūlān navatara puna: Now, the question of Yājñavalkya comes. He puts a question. "If a tree is cut, it grows again; it does not perish. A new tree, as it were, grows from the stem which remains even after the tree is cut. Now I ask you a question, my dear friends. What is the thing which enables the human being to grow even after death?" Martya svin mtyunā vka kasmān mūlāt prarohati: "If death is to snatch away the body of an individual, from which root does he grow again into new birth?" You know how the tree grows even if it is cut. But, how does the human being grow? He is killed by death, and his body is no more. When there is nothing which can be called remnant of the individual after the death of the body, what is the seed out of which his new body is fashioned? What is the connection between the future birth of an individual and the present state of apparent extinction at the time of death? Retasa iti mā vocata: "Do not tell me that the man is born out of the seed of the human being. No; because the seed can be there only in a living human being. A dead person has no seed. So the man is dead. What is it that becomes the connection between the present annihilation and the future birth? It is not the seed; it is something else." Jīvatas tat prajāyate; dhānāruha iva vai vka añjasā pretyasambhava: "The tree grows out of the seed. If the seed is not there, how can the tree grow? Something vital must be there in the tree in order that the trunk, at least, may grow. But if nothing is there, suppose you pluck out every root of the tree itself, there would be no further growth of the tree." Yat samūlam āvheyu vkam, na punar ābhavet: "If the root of a tree is pulled out, the tree will not grow. So, if the root of a person is pulled out at the time of death, what is it that grows after death?" Martya svin mtyunā vka kasmān mūlāt prarohati: "You cannot conceive of any root for the individual being. There is no root if everything is destroyed. The body has gone. He does not leave a seed behind him, nor is there a root left. Even the root has gone. So, what is the answer to this question?"

Jāta eva na jāyate, konvena janayet puna: "You may say; he is born and he is dead." The matter is over. Where is the question of his rebirth? Who tells you that there is rebirth? So, why do we not say that the matter is very simple. Something has come; something has gone; the matter is over. So, there is no question of there being a connection between the present state of annihilation and the future birth. "No," says Yājñavalkya. "It is not possible because – konvena janayet puna na jāyate – if there is not to be rebirth, there would be an inexplicability of the variety of experiences in the present individuals." You will find that there is no answer to the question as to why there is variety of constitutions. One can enjoy what one does not deserve, and one can suffer the consequences of actions which one has not done. If there is not going to be any connection between the past and the future, anyone's actions can bear fruit in any other individual. If I do good, you may get the reward, or I may do bad, you may suffer for it. If this is not to take place, there should be some connection between the present condition of the individual and the future condition. The impossibility or the unjustifiability of someone enjoying what he does not deserve, or another suffering that which is not the consequence of his actions, is called Akritābhyasma and Prītināa in Sanskrit.

Yājñavalkya says, there is nothing conceivably left of the individual when he perishes in his physical body, but there is something which connects him with even the remotest form of life. He can be born in the most distant regions, not necessarily in this world. After the death of the body, rebirth can take place, not necessarily in this world but in most distant regions. What is it that carries you to that distant region? Vijñānam ānandam brahma, rātir dātu parāyaa: "It is the Absolute that is responsible for it, ultimately. He is the bestower of the fruits of all actions." And actions yield fruit only on account of the existence of the Absolute. If it were not to be, actions will not produce any result, and no cause will be connected to any effect. So, ultimately it is the Consciousness-Bliss which is the Supreme Brahman that is the root of the individual. Vijñānam ānandam brahma, rātir dātu parāyaa, tiṣṭhamānasya tadvida: "It is the support of not only the individual in future birth, but also the ultimate support of one who is established in It, by knowing It." So, the Supreme Being, the Absolute, is the support not only of the individuals that transmigrate in the process of Samsāra, but also the ultimate resort of the liberated soul who knows It and becomes It by self-identification. So, it is the goal not only relative to all the Jīvas, but also absolute to the ātman in all the Jīvas. Yājñavalkya closes his discourse and the audience disperses. The Supreme Brahman is the source of all. Every value, visible or perceivable in life, is due to Its Being. It functions not as individuals do. It acts not, but Its very existence is all action. Its very Being is all value, and the goal of the lives of all individuals is the realisation of this Brahman.